Hope College

Digital Commons @ Hope College
14th Annual Celebration for Undergraduate
Research and Creative Performance (2015)

Celebration for Undergraduate Research and
Creative Performance

4-10-2015

Do the Highly Skilled Rich Pay Income Taxes?
State Tax Incidence using Major League Baseball
Data
Joshua Coulter

Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.hope.edu/curcp_14
Recommended Citation
Repository citation: Coulter, Joshua, "Do the Highly Skilled Rich Pay Income Taxes? State Tax Incidence using Major League
Baseball Data" (2015). 14th Annual Celebration for Undergraduate Research and Creative Performance (2015). Paper 9.
http://digitalcommons.hope.edu/curcp_14/9
April 10, 2015. Copyright © 2015 Hope College, Holland, Michigan.

This Poster is brought to you for free and open access by the Celebration for Undergraduate Research and Creative Performance at Digital Commons
@ Hope College. It has been accepted for inclusion in 14th Annual Celebration for Undergraduate Research and Creative Performance (2015) by an
authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Hope College. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@hope.edu.

Do the Highly Skilled Rich Pay State Income Taxes:
State Tax Incidence using Major League Baseball Data
Joshua R. Coulter
Research Advisor: Dr. Sarah M. Estelle
Senior Research Project in Economics

Abstract
This research studies the responsiveness of the rich to state
income taxes. Interstate migration is worrisome to policy makers
because talent may move, in effect voting for lower income taxes
with their feet. Furthermore, businesses may choose to locate
elsewhere if they bear the burden of the tax or if they cannot
attract skilled labor. To test whether employers or highly
productive employees bear the burden of the state income tax and
to what extent, I use Major League Baseball Data (MLB) from
1992-2012 of all free agent transactions. MLB data is useful in
this analysis because it provides both performance and salary
data, which is nearly impossible to observe in other highly skilled
markets. I will use team and year fixed effects to find the effect of
taxes on take home pay. This will help control for other factors in
a free agent’s decision-making processes such as team and city
characteristics.

Introduction

• People have the choice to move freely amongst states,
does the income tax rate matter in the decision making
process?
• Studies looking at rich responsiveness to income taxes
have trouble controlling for exogenous factors Young
and Varner (2011) Bakija and Slemrod (2004)
• Researchers often look to baseball and sports labor
markets to study economic problems because salaries
are public and performance is observable
• Ross and Dunn (2007) and Alm, Kaempfer, and
Sennoga (2012) look at the relationship between
baseball contracts and state income tax but are
restricted by sample size

Theory

• Baseball free agency is an open market for players with
expired contracts
• Labor demand is fixed because teams cannot have
more than 25 players– having less than 25 does not
happen
• Laborers bear little to none of the tax because of the
inelastic demand curve

Results
Data

• Combine 3 datasets for baseball statistics- Retrosheet,
Lahman Baseball Database, and Baseball Reference
WAR Database
• Use the NBER’s state income tax data, Zillow for
median house price by Major League City

Empirical Plan

• Do incomes change? Measure if player nominal salary
increases when state tax rate increase by controlling for
player performance, a team vector, and a city vector
• Year fixed and city fixed effects are incorporated into
some models but may have limitations

Limitations

• Unable to find local income tax data
• Unobservable contract charteristics such as number of
years, no trade clauses, player or team options
• Unobservable player preferences such as hometown,
weather etc.
• Unobservable team preferences

• Wins above replacement (WAR), a performance metric, is the
best predictor of salary for a player
• Pitchers are paid more, on average, than hitters on average
• Players take median house price and attendance play a role in
negotiations
• The role of tax rates could not be determined, the standard
errors are too large
• Team fixed effects does not provide a reliable estimate of the
role of taxation because tax rates do not change from state to
state overtime
• Player migration based on tax rate yield similar inconclusive
results.

Conclusions

• Players and teams find negotiate contracts based on a variety
of external and internal factors
• Player performance, above all is the largest determinate in
salaries
• Unobservable characteristics and data limitations lead to large
standard errors and mitigate the ability to find causality of tax
rates on salary and talent migration

Introduction
• People have the choice to move freely amongst states, does the income tax rate
matter in the decision making process?

• Studies looking at rich responsiveness to income taxes have trouble controlling
for exogenous factors Young and Varner (2011) Bakija and Slemrod (2004)

• Researchers often look to baseball and sports labor markets to study economic
problems because salaries are public and performance is observable

• Ross and Dunn (2007) and Alm, Kaempfer, and Sennoga (2012) look at the

relationship between baseball contracts and state income tax but are restricted
by sample size

Theory

• Baseball free agency is an open market for players with expired
contracts

• Labor demand is fixed because teams cannot have more than 25
players– having less than 25 does not happen

• Laborers bear little to none of the tax because of the inelastic
demand curve

Data
• Combine 3 datasets for baseball statistics- Retrosheet, Lahman

Baseball Database, and Baseball Reference WAR Database
• Wins Above Replacement: wins supplied by a players statistics
above the best minor league player at that position

• Use the NBER’s state income tax data
• Use Zillow’s median house price by Major League City
• Over 4000 free agent transactions from 1992-2012

Empirical Plan
 Do incomes change? Measure if player nominal salary

increases when state tax rate increase by controlling for
player performance, a team vector, and a city vector

• Do players migrate? Average of player performance over the
3 years after the contact year controlling for nominal salary,
team and city effects

•Year fixed and city fixed effects are incorporated into some
models but may have limitations

Limitations
•Unable to find local income tax data
•Unobservable contract charteristics such as

number of years, no trade clauses, player or team
options

•Unobservable player preferences such as
hometown, weather etc.

•Unobservable team preferences

Results Discussion
•Wins above replacement (WAR), a performance metric, is the best
predictor of salary for a player

•Pitchers are paid more, on average, than hitters on average
•Players take median house price and attendance play a role in
negotiations

•The role of tax rates could not be determined, the standard errors are too
large

•Team fixed effects does not provide a reliable estimate of the role of

taxation because tax rates do not change from state to state overtime

•Player migration based on tax rate yield similar inconclusive results.

Conclusions
•Players and teams find negotiate contracts based on a
large variety of external and internal factors

•Player performance, above all is the largest
determinate in salaries

•Unobservable characteristics and data limitations lead
to large standard errors and mitigate the ability to find
causality of tax rates on salary and talent migration

